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No. 9633

BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENTS
NATURE OF T'HE CASE
In this brief the plaintiffs below will be referred to
as "appellants" or "Bennetts" and the defendants below
will be referred to as ''respondents'' or ''Whites." This
suit was brought by the appellants against the respondents for rescision of a construction contract upon the
grounds of fraud. The appellants alleged, firstly, that
the respondent White obtained the appellant's signa1
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ture to the building contract upon the false representation that he would complete the construction, whereas
he had no intention of doing so. Appellants alleged, secondly, that respondent White fraudulently represented
that he would carry the contract for 4 years.

DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The respondents moved for dismissal of the complaint upon the grounds that it did not state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, and this motion was
allowed. The appellants filed an amended complaint,
which in the opinion of respondents alleged nothing significantly different from the ·original complaint which
had been dismissed by the court. A different judge of
the district court denied respondent's motion to dismiss
this complaint and the matter thereafter proceeded to
trial before an advisory jury. The court submitted three
special interrogatories to the jury (R. 109), the answers
to which were not helpful to the court in arriving at a
determination of the issues of the case. They certainly
did not warrant or justify a finding of fraud, and the
court so ruled.
In any event, respondents filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the court thereafter filed a memorandum decision (R 115-119) in which
he reas·oned and concluded that the allegations of fraud
had not been established by clear and convincing evidence and thereafter his decree dismissing the complaint
and granting judgment of no cause of action in favor
of the respondents was entered. The appellants made a
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motion for a new trial, which was denied; and this appeal was instituted to reverse the decision of the lower
court.
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
By this appeal, the appellants seek to obtain the
reversal of the judgment of the lower court in favor of
the respondents no cause of action and dismissing the
complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents are not satisfied with the staten1ent
of facts set forth in appellants' brief, for the reasons
that the statement is not complete and appellants so
called state1nent of facts is so colored and intermingled
with argument that it is difficult to separate that which
is factual from that which is argumentative. Inasmuch
as we take the position that there are no facts in the
record which either indicate or establish fraud, it is rather difficult to select from the record the facts which will
assist the court most in reviewing this matter.
The facts in this case show that on or about July
1, 1960, the Bennetts and the Whites entered into a
contract whereby \Vhites agreed to sell a home, thereafter to be constructed, to Bennetts for the sum of
$30,975.00 (Ex. 6-D, 168-70). Just previous to the contract, the Bennetts had selected the plan which was used
in the construction of the home. The contract recited a
down payment of $2,000.00 which was paid in the form
of a check. (Ex. 2-D, R 171). The house was completed
within about 90 days, except for very minor details (R
3
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180). During the construction .M:rs. Bennett came on the
j'Oh about every day (R 347). Several changes were made
in the home but all of them were with the full knowledge and consent of the Bennetts (R 162-163). There
were many changes made in the plans which increased
the cost to the respondents, and this cost was not passed
on to the appellants. The lighting fixtures exceeded the
rulowance made for them by $228.00 (Ex. 5-D); and there
were a lot ·of extras not included in Exhibit 5-D (R 206).
Mrs. Bennett wanted a stairway identical to another
existing stairway which was duplicated for her. However,
after installation it did not suit her exactly and was
taken out at considerable expense (R 207). The specifications called for rock installation to mantle height, but
respondents installed the rock all the way to the ceiling
at considerable cost and this expense was not passed
on to the Bennetts. :h1:rs. Bennett kept the painters bewildered by changing her mind with respect to paint
work. There were four or five coats of paint in many
parts of the house, both inside and out, where only three
coats were specified. No extra charge was made for this.
A larger furnace than the one specified was installed in
the house and no extra charge was passed on to the Bennetts (R 208). Respondents were charged $80.00 extra
for electrical outlets requested by the appellants (R
320). Whereas the light fixtures called for $125.00 allowance, $353.25 was actually spent, notwithstanding the
fact that Mrs. Bennett had told Mr. White that there
had been no exceeding of the allowance for light fixtures.
Mrs.. Bennett chose a range that cost $70.00 more than
the one ordinarily used (R 120). No extra charge was
made for these items.
4
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The respondents had a conference with the appellants just prior to the signing of the final contract dated
October 25, 1960 (Ex. 3-P) with respect to changes in
construction and extras. In this conference White listed
certain items showing a debit for extras and other items
showing a credit to appellants for variations from the
plan which reduced the cost (Ex. 5-D, R 186-187). The
difference between the credits and debits was added to
the purchase price and reflected in the October 25, 1960,
contract (Ex. 3-P, R-211). The Bennetts entered into
possession on or about October 23 or October 24, 1960,
at which time the house was completed except for very
minor details (R 180). Bennett was a graduate of the
University of Utah Law School and was a law clerk
for the firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & :McCarthy
at the time he signed both the original contract during
the latter part of June, 1960, and the final contract on
October 25, 1960 (R 288). Mr. Bennett examined Exhibit
6-D before he signed it, and he knew what was in it (R
289). He examined the typewritten provisions of the
contract before signing it and understood the purchase
price and was not misled about it (R 290) .. He understood the teTms of payment written into the contract
(R 290) and the agreement to refinance within a fouryear period from date (Ex. 6-D). The latter provision
followed a discussion with White in which White indicated a willingness to carry Bennetts for four years
to have his equity paid back (R 293). Bennett understood, both as a buyer and as a lawyer, that under the
wording of the contract White could not require him
to refinance for four years (R 293). There was no dispute as to the purchase price appearing on Exhibit 3-P,
5
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the agreement of October 25, 1960 (R 301). Bennett considered the contract to be fair after the house was completed (R 302). The terms of payments set forth in
Exhibit 3-P seemed fair and proper to him and he understood them (R 303).
With respect to the claimed misrepresentation by
White that he would not assign the contract, Bennett
admitted that White had not said anything about
not assigning - ''He just said, 'I am carrying it for
four years.'" (305). Bennett could not recall White's
ever saying that he would not assign the contract (R
306). During the course of construction, a wooden floor
had been substituted for the cement one and this change
was discussed with the Bennetts before the installation
was made (R 212). In order to have put a concrete slab
it would have necessitated fourteen feet of fill dirt which
would have cost thousands of dollars to install. This
was determined within about a week of commencement
of construction and was discussed with the Bennetts at
that time. At the time White met with the Bennetts, prior
to the signing of the Octo her 25, 1960 contract, the
wooden floor was in place and was not raised as an issue.
No extra charge was made for the floor and no offset
was claimed by the Bennetts. (R. 214). At the time of
signing the final contract there was no discussion at all
and no representation that Mr. White would continue
to hold the contract and not assign it. The contract itself
in paragraph 3 (Ex. 3-P) provides that the purchase
price- shall be- payable - ''at the office of seller, his
assigns, or order" (R 216). There was no statement
made at the time the contract was signed to the effect
6
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that White would give a moratorium with respect to
payments (R 216). The payment provisions appearing
on Exhibit 3-D were discussed and arranged for the convenience of the Bennetts. (R 217). The home had all
of its appropriate inspections; its framing inspection
by the city Mechanical Department; its electrical inspection by the Electrical Department of the city; and its
plumbing inspection by the Plumbing Department of
the city (R 219). After taking possessi'on, the Bennetts
made a complaint to the State Contractors Department
which resulted in a hearing attended by the Bennetts
and the Whites. As a result of this hearing, the Contractors Department wrote a letter to Mr. White on
:November 18, 1960, (Ex. 8-D) specifying certain items
that should be taken care of. Immediately upon receiving this letter, vVhite ·organized his forces to make the
corrections and all these corrections were made (R 222223). A former Veterans Administration and F.H.A.
Inspector, testifying for the appellants, admitted that
the workmanship of the house was average or a little
above; that he could see nothing wrong with the material; that the kitchen cabinets installed were average
or above (R 246) ; that the paint job was average (R
249). Mr. White remembered that during the course of
the visit of the inspectors from the state at the house
that he told the Bennetts that the things recommended
by the inspector would be done. (R 257). The Bennetts
moved out of the house about N ovemher 25, 1960 (R
311) and thereafter served upon the respondents notice
of rescision of the contract (Ex. 4-P).

7
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHI:CH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED.

The basic elements ·of fraud under the previous decisions of this court are (1) a representation, (2) that
is false, (3) and rna terial, (4) known by the speaker to
be false, ( 5) and made with the intent that it should be
acted upon in the manner reasonably contemplated (6)
the heare,r ignorant of its falsity, (7) relying upon its
truth, (8) and has a right reasonably to rely thereon,
(9) to his injury. See Struck vs. Delta Land and Water
Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791-795.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of
Southern Development Company vs. Silva, 125 U.S. 247,
8 S. Ct. 881, 31 L.Ed. 678, holds similarly:
''In order to establish a charge of this character (fraud) the complaintant must show by
clear and decisive proof first, that the defendant has made a representation in regard to a material fact; secondly, that such representation
is false; thirdly, that such representation was
actually believed by the defendant on reasonable
grounds to be true; fourthly, that it was made
with the intent that it should be acted on; fifthly,
that it was acted on by complainant to his damage ; and sixthly, that in so acting on it the complainant was ignorant of its falsity and reasonably believed it to be true ...
"It is also well settled that the fraud involved
must relate to facts that exist or which have previously existed. 12 R. C.L. 254, Annotation 51,
A.L.R. p. 49."
8
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See also Oberg 'VS. Sanders 111 Utah 507, 184 Pac.
2d. 229, Campbell vs. Zions Co-op Home Co., 46 Utah 1,
148 P. 401, Ackerman vs. Bramwell, 80 Utah 52, 12 P.2d

623.
A promise to do s·omething in the future does not
involve a presently existing fact, and the allegations
of fraud in this case have reference to the promise of
the respondents to do something or refrain from doing
something in the future. Secondly, the appellants must
have reasonably relied upon the false misrepresentation.
It is difficult for respondents to conceive ·of a situation
where a party entering into a contract, which by its
terms provides that it may be assigned and by its terms
calls for specific payments with a specific grace period,
can reasonably rely upon representation about an indefinite grace period or moratorium. If the parties were
talking about a different grace period such as the indefinite moratorium which appellants allege, they had full
opportunity to incorporate provisions to this effect in
the contract. It hardly seems reasonable for appellants
to say that the contract provided one thing, which was
very clear to them, but they relied upon the seller to
do something altogether different, if in the indefinite
future they might be unable to make a payment. This
appears to be a plain, unadulterated attempt to vary the
clear unambiguous terms of a written instrument by
parole evidence.
We desire to call the court's attention to the following statement in Wigmore on Emdenoe, 2d Ed. ·§ 2430:
"Since the amount, time and manner of payment is dealt with by the writing, the intent of
9
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the parties to incorporate therein all that element
of the oral negotiation would ordinarily be conclusively presumed."
The previous negotiations of the parties with respect to assignability of the contract and with respect
to the method of payment and period of grace were incorporated and resolved in the clear terms of the written instrument. See 111itchess vs. Lott (N.Y.) 160 N.E.
646, Higgs vs. deMaziroff (N.Y.) 189 N.E. 355.
Damage is another essential element of actionable
fraud. There is no allegation in the amended complaint
which reasonably disclosed that the buyers were damaged by reason of the failure of the sellers to retain
their interest as sellers in the contract. They were not
damaged by assignment of the contract because the assignee was under the same obligations to perform as the
respondents. l\1:oreover, the appellants served a notice
of rescision before the first payment was due and it
would have to be assumed or presumed that the assignee
would be less considerate and less charitable than the
seller in order that the appellants nright have been injured by the alleged fraudulent promise not to assign
the contract. The appellants cannot say that they suffered damage because the respondents assigned the contract and deprived the1nselves of the power to grant an
indefinite moratorium if son1etime in the future appellants defaulted. From all that appears in the allegations
of the amended complaint, the assignees would have been
just as lenient as the respondents. If the appellants'
obligations could not be changed by the assignment, it
must necessarily follow that the assignn1ent of the con-

10
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tract could not cause legal damage or injury to the appellants; and it is hard to understand how a misrepresentation could be either materially or actionably fraudulent
if the appellants coud suffer no injury, even if it were
false.
There IS no allegation in the amended complaint
that the improvements were not substantially completed.
Not every breach of contract would constitute a ground
for rescision before a partial failure of performance of
·one party will give the other the right of rescision. The
failure of performance must go to the root of the contract. 9 Am. J ur. § 78, p. 1020.
In the second count, the appellants allege mutual
mistake as a basis for rescinding the contract resulting
from the fraud of respondents in making the same false
representations alleged in the first count. Certainly,
this count, too, must fall by its own weight, lacking the
essential elements of fraud.
POINT TWO
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF FRAUD AND THE
COURT'S FINDING TO THAT EFFECT WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE.

So far as we are able to gather from the appellants'
amended complaint and brief, they claim that the respondents were guilty of fraud in two respects: (1) Respondent falsely represented that he would carry the
contract for four years and he had no intention of doing
so. (2) Respondent induced the appellants to enter into
the contract by falsely representing that he would com11
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plete the construction of the home when he had no intention of doing so. We will consider these two propositions in order. In this case, the attitude of the respondents appeal" from the evidence to have been more appropriately classified as benevolent than fraudulent. The
lot upon which the house was to be built by the respondents was valued at $6,500. (R 2.55). The $2,000.00 down
payment furnished by the appellants represented less
than one-third of the value of the lot and yet the respondents were willing to bear the financial burden of constructing the house upon this lot and to wait four years
to recover baclt th~ir equity, while patiently requiring
the appellants to pay only su£fieient monthly payments
to keep the construction mortgage current. This proved
to be foolishly generous on the part of the respondent;
it certainly was not fraudulent. When the respondents
assigned the eontract, they had to discount the contract
to the extent of approximately $3,600.00 in order to pay
the bills on the home that could not be covered by the
mortgage money. But, of course, the respondents
couldn't, nor would they attempt, to pass this problem
on to the appellants, beeause under the contract respondents were bound to wait four years before receiving
payment of their equity. The statement that the respondents would carry the appellants for a period of four
years was promissory in nature and did not constitute
the representation of an existing material fact.

We are not unmindful of the holding of this oourt
in the case of Hull vs. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, P. 2d 56,
which involved the principle of misrepresentation of intention or of state of mind. The case has no application
12
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here because respondent's fraudulent intention or state
of mind was not established by any evidence. In the first
place, the representation by White that he would carry
the contract for four years was not false. The original
contract (Ex. 6-D) recites a purchase price of $30,975.00
with a downpayment of merely $2,000.00 and a monthly
payment of the balance o-f $160.00 and the appellants
admitted that this monthly payment would not pay the
seller's equity back at all, inasmuch as $160.00 per month
was required to meet the mortgage payments on the
house. The payment provisions of the contract (Ex. 6-D)
contain the following significant language: "In any event,
buyer to refinance within a f·our-year period from date."
It is clear that respondent's representation that he would
carry the appellants for four years was given effect
by this provision in the contract and Bennett admitted
that he understood as a buyer and as a lawyer that under
the wording of the contract, respondents would not require him to refinance for four years; and White would
have to literally carry the appellants for that period of
time without receiving any part of his equity. Now it
is also undisputed in the evidence that because of changes
made throughout the course of construction, which in
some instances benefited the builder and in other instances, the buyers, the parties sat down together and
arrived at an adjustment of the purchase price of the
property, which adjustment is evidenced in part by Exhibit 5-D.
This exhibit gives credit to the appellants for deviations from the plan which benefited the respondents;
and also sets forth charges made against the appellants

13
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for extras; and the final contract (Ex. 3-P) was prepared to reflect this increase in price. Of course, there
were many extras pointed out in our statement of facts
that are not included in this adjustment and were allowed by the respondents gratuitously. The terms of
payment set forth in Exhibit 3-P, the final contract of
October 25, 1960, seemed fair and proper to the appellants and they understood them. The contract also contained the provision :
"Buyer agrees to refinance the above property on or before October 25, 1964."
When asked why that provision was put into the final
contract, Mr. Bennett answered:
"Yes, it was put in the original terms that
it would be carried by Mr. White until the end
of four years, at least four years."
and this provision was made to give effect to the representations made by Mr. White that he would carry his
equity in the contract for four years before· requiring
the appellants to refinance and pay him off (R 303-304).
It is true that the appellants attempt by their brief to
twist this representation into a promise that the respondents would not assign the contract for four years. However, when asked directly if Mr. White had ever stated
that he would not assign the contract, Bennett testified
that:
"White didn't say anything about assigning,
he said 'I run carrying it for four years.'" (R 305)
Bennett could not recall White's ever saying that
he would not assign the contract (R 306). It would, therefore, appear that the only attempt at deceit in this case

14
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is the effort on the part of the appellants to distort a
promise to wait f.or payment of an equity into a promise
not to assign. Of course, if the distortion were allowed,
the appellants would still fail because they never proved
that White intended to lose $3,600.00 by assigning the
original contract entered into July 1, 1960, and Bennett
knew that he was negotiating for the assignment of the
final contract entered into on October 25, 1960, at the
time this contract was signed. Mr. Bennett, one of the
appellants in this case, was a graduate lawyer, employed
as a law clerk in a prominent law firm. He knew as a
lawyer that he could not avoid his contract unlses he
concocted this flimsy theory of fraud. Bennett examined
the contract, understood all its provisions, particularly
with reference to the method of payment and the 30-days
grace allowed by the contract. He claims that White made
some vague promise to give the appellants a mortatorium
of some kind if in the, future, they might be unable to make
a payment. He knew as a lawyer that even if such a
statement had been made by the respondents, which they
deny, that he could not reasonably rely upon such an
indefinite promise and it is foolish for him now to claim
that he was thereby induced to enter into the contract.
As a lawyer, it is foolish for him to attempt to impose
upon this court by saying that although the written instrument resolved the oral negotiations of the parties
with respect to the grace period of 30 days, the parties
intended a vague and indefinite mortatorium instead. If
when he signed the contract, Mr. Bennett entertained
the foolish expectation that he could enjoy all of the benefits of the contract without honoring his own promise
to make any of the payments, he was naive, indeed. As
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heretofore pointed out, .the contract by its very terms
mentions its assignability - the payments were to be
made at the· office of seller, "his assigns, or order.'' (Ex..
hibit 6.-D').
There is no evidence whatsoever that the appellants
suffered any damage by reason of the representation
that respondents would carry them for four years. Even
if such representation were twisted into meaning that
they would not assign the contract, the appellants served
notice of rescision and vacated the property before the
first payment became due and they admitted that they
were able to make· the first payment at that time.
There was no evidence to show that the assignee
of the contract would be less liberal or considerate than
the respondents whom they now attempt to clothe in
the evil garments of fraud. Injury n1ust be proved and
not presumed. Of course, the record shows the express
denial of White that he ever agreed not to assign the
contract (R 216); and White testified that no statement
was made at the time that the contract was signed with
respect to giving moratorium (R 216). Such a claim
now is in direct variance with the payment provision
and the 30 days grace period specified in the contract;
and the appellant as a layman, much less as a graduate
lawyer, would have no right to rely upon it anyway.
The claim that respondent induced the appellants
to enter into the contract by simply representing that he
would complete the construction of the home when he
had no intention of doing so, is based on fantasy; not
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upon evidence. In the first place, at the time the appellants and the respondents entered into the original contract before the work was commenced on construction
of the home and at which time the appellants paid the
down payment - which was the only money they ever
paid- White clearly intended to build a house as agreed.
He 1nanifested this intention by virtually completing
it within 90 days even though the appellants had requested numerous changes, such as installing a stairway
three times and putting on four or five coats of paint
in an effort to please Mrs. Bennett. It would require
a violent stretch of the imagination to say that White
on July 1, 1960, did not intend to build a house to completion for the appellants and there is no evidence on the
record from which such intention could possibly be inferred. When the house was substantially completed,
the respondents at the request of the appellants permitted them to move in. When the respondents signed
the final contract (Ex. 3-P), they were living in the
house and they were simply adjusting the sales price
to reflect the change for some of the extras which had
been installed. The contract otherwise was identical to
the first one. How can appellants reasonably say they
'vere fraudulently induced to sign this final agreement
when they fully understood all its terms and had concurred in them~ They claim, although they did not prove,
that White made a promise he had no intention of performing at the time he made it. White testified that he
intended at all times to complete the house and he did
in fact thereafter complete it (R 222-223, 361).

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The witness, Aae, testified that he heard Mrs. Bennett say to ~1:r. White after the hearing at the Contractors
Department held in November, that there was no use
of doing anything more, and that was two weeks before
Bennetts 1noved out. At that time the respondent was
willing to go down and do all that ~1:rs. Bennett wanted
done (R 354). The appellants altogether failed to prove
a fraudulent intent of the respondents with respect to
the compJ.etion of the house. Appellants claim that several days after representing that he would complete the
house and several days after the October 25th contract
was signed, White told ~1:rs. Bennett that he had finished
the house as far as he was concerned and would do no
more, and l\1:rs. Bennett further claimed that she was
told if she wanted any more work done on the house
she would have to sue him. The trial judge was not convinced of the truth of this testimony and in his memorandum decision, he calls attention to the fact that circumstances developed after the singing which may have
provoked White into making the statements attributed
to him, even if appellants' version of the contract were
believed. This would appear to be more evidence that
White had changed his mind than proof of an incipient
fraudulent intent. The trial judge had the opportunity
of observing the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses and the trial judge was convinced that vVhite
was not a deceiver and a cheat. This court's attention
is directed to the memorandum decision (R 115) in which
the trial court announced the reason for its decision.
There can be no doubt but what its decision and findings
were based upon a fair preponderance of the evidence,
and the appellants altogether failed at the trial to intro-
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duce clear and convincing evidence of fraud, and under
the nu1nerous decisions of this court and by the great
weight of authority, evidence of fraud warranting the
rescision of a contract must be clear and convincing.
J:Por example, see Chapman vs. Troy Laundry Company,
87 Utah 15, 47 P.2d. p. 1054, 1065. Southern Development

Company vs. Silva, sup·ra; Nielsen vs. Learrning·ton Mines
and Exploration Corporation, 48 P. 2d 439.
'rhe appellants grasp at the further straw that respondent installed a wooden floor instead of a concrete
floor as contemplated by the plans and specifications
and they say that respondents lied when they promised
to complete the house because they had no intention of
installing the concrete floor. There is no merit to this
contention. The substitution of the wooden floor for the
concrete floor was discussed with the Bennetts before
the substitution was made (R 212). This discussion took
place long before the October 25th contract was ever
signed. Without this change it would have been necessary
to put a concrete slab upon fourteen feet of fill dirt.
The witness, Aae, testified that the concrete floor could
not have been safely built upon the fill dirt and that
this was discussed with the Bennetts. It was, therefore,
in the appellants' interest that these changes were made.
Bennetts had been on the job frequently and were present when the wooden floor was installed. This issue was
not raised at the time the sales price· was adjusted by
reason of the various changes in the plans. The Bennetts
knew at the time they signed the contract on October 25,
1960, that they had a wooden floor and that the respondents had no intention of changing it to a concrete floor.
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There was no proof that White at any time orally promised or represented that he would install a concrete floor
in the basement.
As was pointed out by the trial court in his memorandum decision, the mere failure to perform the work
does not constitute evidence of an intent not to do it at
the time the promise was made. As a matter of fact, a
promisor for a good or bad reason may change his mind
about the keeping of a promise within an hour after the
promise is made and this would not constitute fraud.
Of course, the appellant Bennett was schooled in
the law and working in a law office, and he knew that
he could not walk out on his contract without some proof
of fraud. He was confronted with the impossible situation of discovering fraud which was non-existent. Even
if the jury in this case believed that Mr. White refused
to do the work several days after he had promised that
it would be done, this is just as much evidence that he
changed his mind as it is evidence that he didn't intend
to keep the promise when he made it. We respectfully
call this court's attention to the "Restatement of Torts,"
Section 530, from which we quote as follows :
"On the other hand, one who acts or relies
upon another's honest statement of his then existing intention, cannot maintain an action for the
loss caused by the disappointment of his expectations, if the other for any reason, good or bad,
changes his mind and fails or refuses to carry
his expressed intention into effect. If the recipient
who is to ohtain legal assurance honestly believes
20
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that his intentions will be carried out, he must
see that it is expressed in the form of an enforceable contract. (c) Proof Of Intention Not To Perform An Agreement. The intention which is necessary to make the rule stated in this section is
the intention of the performance when the agreement was entered into. The intention of the performer not to perform an enforceable or unenforceable agreement cannot be established solely
by proof of its non-performance, nor does his
failure to perform the agreement throw upon him
the burden of showing that the non-performance
was due to reasons that occurred after the agreement was entered into."
In a hypothetical situation, a person can make a
thoroughly honest and sincere promise on one day and
the following day can change his mind for some reason
or other. We have in the case at bar, a situation where
the parties worked along agreeably under a contract for
three months until the house was completed to a point
where the buyer could take possession. At that time they
even agreed without difficulty upon the credits which
should be given for changes in the plans and specifications and for the increased amount which the appellant
should pay for the extras performed. This agreement
was shown by a written document in evidence. We submit that in all fairness this Court could not do equity
between these parties by permitting the plaintiffs to walk
out of this contract, even if it should have been made
to appear from part of the evidence that a few things
remained to be done when the appellants left. Certainly,
all of these matters could be handled without difficulty
and without great cost and the appellants had a full, ade-
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quate and complete. remedy at law. In order to be given
the extraordinary relief of rescinding the contract, the
burden was upon the appellants to show by clear and
convincing evidence that they were the victims of fraud.
Under the evidence they got everything they bargained
for.
POINT THREE
EVEN IF THE OCTOBER 25, 1960 CONTRACT WERE
RESCINDED, THE APPELLANTS WOULD STILL BE UNDER OBLIGATION TO PURCHASE THE HOUSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE EARLIER CONTRACT AS MODIFIED BY THE AGREEMENT TO PAY FOR
EXTRAS.

It appears from the evidence that the plaintiffs
paid $2,000.00 prior to the execution of the July contract and prior to the construction of the home. No fraud
is attached to the negotiations and agreement when this
Slun was paid. During the course of construction, the
parties agreed on certain deviations from the plans and
specifications which were resolved by oral agreement
just prior to the signing of the modifying contract on
October 25, 1960. Therefore, when the parties affixed
their signatures to the 1nodifying agreement, the plaintiffs were already under obligation to purchase the house
which was under construction and to pay for the extras
in accordance with an oral agreen1ent which was supported by the 1nen1orandmn received in evidence.
Even if the Court should rescind the October 25th
nwdifying agreement, it would still leave the· parties
in the position they were in immediately prior thereto.
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Jo not believe that the evidence justifies resClsiOn
of the October 25th modifying agreement, but in any
case, the court would not be doing equity in this matter if it attempted to do more than restore the parties
to the position they were in when the agreement was
signed. The plaintiffs did not part with any money on
October 25, 1960. The parties simply incorporated into
writing the modifications of the contract which had been
previously orally agreed upon.
Moreover, it does not appear clear to respondents
how appellants can be said to have been induced to enter
into the modifying contract by respondents' promise to
do the work which respondents had already agreed to do
as a part of the original construction agreement. Appellants did not change their position and were not induced
to change their position in any respect. Both parties were
simply agreeing to do what they were already bound to
do. If the contract was breached by any subsequent
failures to comple·te the house, it was a simple matter
for the appellants to have procured such completion and
to have claimed credit on the contract for the cost of the
same. This would give them a full and adequate remedy
without leaving the Court with the necessity of speculating over the state of mind of the· respondents on October
25, 1960, or about whether, against the great quantum
of proof, the house was not substantially completed.
POINT FOUR
THE WORK PERFORMED BY 'THE RESPONDENTS
OVER AND ABOVE THE CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS
NEGATES IMPLICATIONS OF FRAUD OR DECEIT.
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There were many extras not included in Exhibit
5-D. In addition to this, no inferior materials were used
on the job. First class workmanship was put into the
house. Where specifications called for 2 x 4 partitions,
rsepondents put in 2 x 6's and whereas many contractors
use 2 x 6 and 2 x 8 floor j<>ists, ·respondents installed
2 x 10 floor joists (R 346). The building inspector, called
by the appellants,, testified that the workmanship was
average or above and that he could see nothing wrong
with the materials, and that the kitchen cabinets were
average or above. (R 245-246).
We believe that the trial judge was fully justified
by this evidence in finding and concluding that the respondent White was not a person lilrely to perpBtrate
fraud. The benevolent heart does not usually beat beneath the cloak of deceit. Mr. White's benevolence is
further indicated by his willingness to sell the $30,000.00
house to appellants with a $2,000.00 down payment and
allowing them a minimum monthly payment for a period
of four years. He n1ade available to them a lot valued at
$6,500.00 so that the down payment represented less than
one-third of the· lot price and White was required to pay
several thousand dollars above the amount he could
borrow to complete the house. Because of the financial
stress which this placed him under, he was later required
to assign the contract and discount it to the extent of
approximately $3,600.00. His interest in being helpful
to the appellants was expensive to him and although he
1nay have been considered unwise from a financial standpoint, it requires a violent stretch of the realities of
the situation to find any aroma of fraud or deceit. It is
24
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regrettable that the recipients of White's benevolence
responded with irresponsible charges of fraud in a carefully planned effort to avoid a contract fully understood
by the appellants, fairly framed, and fully performed
by the respondents.

CONCLUSION
For the. various reasons set forth in this brief, and
for many other reasons that may occur to this court
in the thoughtful consideration of this matter, we respectfully urge this court to affirm the judgment heretofore
entered by the district court.
Respectfully submitted,
WOODROW D. WIDTE,
Attorney for Respondents
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